David Frantz has the financial background to run a successful program, but will OMB let him?The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
announced that it is implementing its loan guarantee program by naming David G. Frantz to serve as its Director. Mr. Frantz will report directly to DOE’s Chief Financial Officer and, in this capacity, will manage DOE’s Loan Guarantee office. The loan guarantees will cover clean energy projects, as authorized under Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct). Projects supported by loan guarantees will include nuclear energy.
Mr. Frantz is currently a Director of Project Finance for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), where he manages a team with worldwide responsibilities for financial transactions. He brings over 30 years of experience in project finance. Mr. Frantz is a decorated Vietnam veteran and has earned two Masters Degrees in international economics and international business and securities studies, respectively from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts. He received a Bachelor of Arts Degree and commission in the U.S. Navy from the Virginia Military Institute;and has completed postgraduate work at the Harvard School of Business.
This is the type of financial background that the nuclear industry asked the Energy Dept, to get in a leader for the loan program. The Senate also called for an experienced executive in the financial services field. They got what they asked for, but it may not alter OMB's position which offers the industry far less in covering debt for new nuclear plants than the industry wants.
The House Appropriations Committee eliminated loan guarantees from the FY2008 Energy appropriations bill. The Senate supported the program. On July 6th Platts
reported this update.
The Senate's no-cap approach would enable DOE to offer loan guarantees large enough to benefit new reactor projects. Last month the House Appropriations panel that controls DOE spending recommended a $7 billion allocation for the entire loan guarantee program in FY-08 and excluded nuclear from the list of eligible projects. The subcommittee action was later approved by the House Appropriations full committee. But Nuclear Energy Institute officials, who went to the subcommittee to make their case, estimated that nuclear projects might need up to $25 billion in loan guarantees in FY-08, according to Richard Myers, NEI's vice president of policy development. Position is an executive appointment, but here are some questions anywayIn this position Mr. Frantz is not subject to Senate confirmation hearings. It is an executive appointment. However, in the spirit of inqiury, here's some questions I'd like to pose to him. It's too bad he's already under the government's policy directives because I doubt he could answer frankly at this point.
So, readers are welcome to offer their own answers via comments. Note that all comments are moderated which is necessary to stop spam and off-topic content.
Q1: The nuclear energy is generally aligned around a position that the guarantees authorized by Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 should cover 80% of the cost and 100% of the debt. The draft loan guarantee regulations
released by the Department of Energy in May limit loan guarantees to 90% of the debt which the industry and its investment banks
say is unworkable. What level do you think the guarantees should be set at or should the industry be supported with guarantees at all?
If there are no loan guarantees, will any new nuclear plants be built? For instance Constellation Energy in Maryland
told the Baltimore Sun in July that if the guarantees are not available it will not build any new nuclear plants.
Q2: The
American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness, a nuclear industry organization, is advocating that the loan guarantees be set at 80% of the cost and 100% of the debt, and, also that the federal guarantee program be expanded to cover other types of nuclear facilities including
* Uranium mills, processing plants, conversion, and enrichment facilities
* Reactor component fabrication facilities
* Used fuel reprocessing facilities
* Education and training programs for plant designers, craft workers, engineers, and operators.
Do you think expansion of the loan guarantees to cover these areas is good public policy for the U.S. or not and why?
If yes, is it politically feasible? If no, why should the U.S. do about its gaps in manufacturing of nuclear plant components and a lack of a trained workforce even for its existing plants?
Q3: Should the U.S. use loan guarantees to develop a strong program of exports of nuclear technologies to advance the nation's goal for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons?
Q4: Some states, such as
Florida, allow
utilities to recoup construction costs as the nuclear plant is being built? Does this give these states an inherent advantage over others? Will "rate-based" state like Florida come out winners relative to other states under this scenario? Is this a useful model for other states? Why or why not?
Q5: If Congress does not approve loan guarantees for new plants, will U.S. investment banks
shift investment priorities to new nuclear plants in other countries leaving a gap in available capital if Congress changes its mind at a later date? What impact, if any, would this scenario have on the prospects for new nuclear plants?
Q6: Should
fees for loan guarantees cover just the administrative costs of the program or should they form an "insurance pool" to cover potential defaults? Should the costs of the fees be passed on to consumers? Should there be any fees at all?
Q7: If Congress does not pass a "workable" loan guarantee program, will it cause the manufacturing base for
heavy forgings in the U.S. to atrophy? What impact, if any, would this scenario have on the prospects for new nuclear plants?
Q8: Should there be a
cap on the total amount of loan guarantees allowed to be offered by the government? With more than two dozen plants on NRC's short list of expected licensing applications, the total demand for investment could be as much as $125 billion. At 80% of the cost and 100% of the debt, the demand for loan coverage could be $100 billion. If there should be a cap, what number do you suggest and why?
Q9: Should loan guarantees be
limited to "innovative" or "advanced" nuclear reactor technologies and denied to conventional reactor designs such as those currently approved by the NRC? If so why or why not?
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